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Jaakko Hintikka
THE UNAMBIGUITY OF ARISTOTELIAN BEING
1. Aristotle does not recognize the Frege-Russell ambiguity of "is."
In th is paper, I shall t ry  to enhance our understanding of Aristotle's thought 
by relating it  to certain contemporary problems and insights of philosophical 
logicians. Now one of the most central cu rren t issues in philosophical logic is a 
challenge to a hundred-year old dogma. Almost all tw entieth-century philosophers in 
English-speaking countries have followed Frege and Russell and claimed that the 
words for being in natural languages — "is,"  " is t,"  }εστι e tc .— are ambiguous 
between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity , and the 
generic is . The significance of th is ambiguity thesis has not been limited to topical 
discussions but has extended to historical studies, including studies of ancient 
Greek philosophy. A generation or two of scholars working in th is area used the 
Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis as an important ingredient of their interpretational 
framework. Cases in point are Cornford, Ross, Guthrie, Cherniss, Vlastos, Ryle, 
and (from the German-language area) Heinrich Maier. Indeed, the Frege-Russell 
distinction is still being invoked occasionally by Aristotelian scholars; see e .g . 
Moravcsik (1967, p . 127), Kirwah (pp. 100-101, 141), Weidemann (1980, p . 78) and 
Gomez-Lobo (1980-81, p . 79).
However, many of us have by this time come to suspect that the Frege-Russell 
ambiguity claim is completely anachronistic when applied to Aristotle. The sources of 
th is dark  professional secret are various, ranging from G. E. L. Owen's brilliant 
studies of Aristotle on being to Charles Kahn's patient examination of the Greek 
verb τδ είναι . Most of us good Aristotelians have nevertheless remained in the 
closet. As was illustrated  by the fate that befell the first major study in which 
Plato's failure to draw the Frege-Russell distinction was noted, most of the un­
liberated Aristotelians seem to have thought that to note Aristotle's failure to draw 
the distinction is to accuse him of an abject logical mistake. (See, e .g . ,  Neal's 
introduction to B luck.) Accordingly, we have shied away from such impiety. It is 
time for some consciousness-raising, however. It is not convincing enough merely to
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reg is te r the inapplicability of the modern distinction to Aristotle. (Gf. Benardete 
1976-77.) We need a deeper understanding  of the whole situation. In an earlier 
paper, I have shown that there  need not be anything logically or semantically 
wrong with a theory which trea ts  the verbs of being as not exhibiting the Frege- 
Russell ambiguity. (See Hintikka 1979.) More than  tha t: not only can we now say th a t 
A ristotle’s procedure is free from any tain t of fallacy; he may have been a b e tte r  
semanticist of natural language^ than Frege and Russell in th is particu lar respec t.
Hence I can without any impiety level at Aristotelian scholars the same c riti­
cisms as Benson Mates recently (1979) directed at Platonic scholars, viz. th a t they  
have been seduced by  the modern myth tha t there  is a distinction between the is of 
iden tity , the is of predication, the is of existence, and the is  of generic impli­
cation; and to proceed to argue that the distinction is not there  in the Aristotelian 
Corpus. Very little  argument is in fact needed here . Not only is it the case tha t 
A ristotle, one of whose main philosophical methods was to make conceptual d istinc­
tions, never draws the distinction. Not only does he fail to reso rt to the Frege- 
Russell distinction in dealing with problems which we would deal with routinely in 
terms of the distinction.
An example is  offered by De Soph. El. 5, 166 b 28-36, where Aristotle is 
considering in te r  alia the fallacious inference form "Coriscus is d ifferent from 
Socrates” ( i .e . ’’Coriscus is not Socrates”) and ’'Socrates is a man” to ’’Coriscus is  
d ifferent from a man" ( i .e . "Coriscus is not a man"). Here we would expect Aris­
totle to make a distinction between the "is" of identity  (used in the firs t premise) 
and the  "is" of predication (used in the second prem ise). His point has been so 
understood by Maier (vol. 2, p . 280), and there  is some prima facie evidence for 
doing so. For instance, the terminological distinction Aristotle uses to expose the 
fallacy, viz. between essential and accidental predication, will in  A ristotle 's la ter 
writings in fact assume (we shall see) the force of a contrast between those predi­
cations which have an element of identity  and those which do not. However, drawing 
the predication v s . identity  distinction is not what Aristotle is doing here . What he 
actually does is to draw a distinction between transitive  and nontransitive 
predications: "It does not necessarily follow that all the same a ttribu tes belong to 
all the predicates of a th ing  and to that of which they are  p red icated ." Applied to 
the example, th is presumably means that "a man" in the second premise is an accident 
of Socrates and tha t therefore the predicable "Coriscus is  d ifferent from x ,"  even 
though it is true  of Socrates, does not have to apply to "a man" since th is is only
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an accident of Socrates. This is not a distinction between two senses of " is ,"  
idèntity  v s. predication, even though it is perhaps not too hard  to see how the 
la tte r distinction should have developed out of what Aristotle does here . (I have 
followed here Dancy 1975, Appendix II .)
What is even more im portant, Aristotle comes as close as one can ever hope to 
denying the ambiguity thesis himself. In Met. Γ 2, 1003 b 22-32, he writes (the 
translation is Kirwan's) :
ε ΐ  äh τδ ’δν καί τδ ιδν ταυτδν 
καί μ ία  φύσι* τω ακολουθεϊν 
αλλήλοΐί ‘ώσπερ αρχδ καί α’ίτ ιο ν ,  
άλλ’ ουχ ω* ευ ΐ λόγω δηλοΰμενα 
(δ ιαφ έρει δδ ουθδν ούδ’ ’δν 
ομοίως ύπολάθωμεν, άλλδ καί 
ιτρδ ’έργου μάλλον)· ταυτδ γδρ 
έι9  άνθρωπο* καί ’hv 'άνθρωπο* 
καί ’άνθρωπο*, καί ουχ ^έτερόν 
τ ι  δηλοΐ κατά ττϊν λ έξ ιν  
επαναδιπλοΰμενον τδ εν* 
εσ τίν  ’άνθρωπο* καί εσ τιν  
ε ΐ ί  ’ϊιν ’άνθρωπο* · δηλον δ ’ ο τ ι 
ου χω ρίζετα ι ο’<3τ’ επί 
γενέσεω ί ο’ΰ τ’ επ ί φθορδ^,ομοίω* 
δδ καί επ ί τοδ ενδ*·
‘ώστε φανερδν ‘άτι η πράσθεσι* 
εν το ύ το ιΐ ταότδ δηλοΐ, 
καί ουδδν έτερον τδ ‘δν 
παρά τδ *öv, . . .
Suppose it t ru e , then , that 
that which is and th a t which 
is one are the same 
th ing—i.e .  one nature—in 
that each follows from the 
other as origin and cause 
do, not as being indicated 
by the same formula (though 
it makes no difference even 
if  we believe them to be like 
tha t—indeed it helps). For 
one man and a man that is 
and a man are the same 
thing; and nothing different 
is indicated by the 
reduplication in wording ’he 
is one man’ and ’he is  one 
man that is ' (it is plain that 
there is no distinction in 
[the processes of] coming to 
be or destruction); equally 
in the case of that which is 
one. It follows obviously tha t 
the addition indicates the 
same th ing  in those cases, 
and that which is one is 
nothing different apart from 
that which is .
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It is important to note that at 1003 b 28 Aristotle is employing τδ είναι (sc . in
*4«Γ )the phrase ε ΰ  ’άνθρωποί ) in what Ϊ shall la ter in th is paper argue to be a purely  
existential use. Nonetheless he is emphatically assuring  us tha t th is use is not 
d ifferent from what in effect are the first two (allegedly separate) Fregean 
meanings of is .
An even b lander assertion to the same effect is found in De Soph. EL 6, 169 a 
8-10: "For the same definition (horos) applies to 'one “single th ing ' and to 'the  
thing ' hap los; the  definition e .g . ,o f  'man' and 'one single man' is the  same, and so, 
too, with other instances."
This p re tty  much confounds the firs t th ree  members of the four-fold distinc­
tion of Frege's and R ussell's. As to the fourth  it is amply clear th a t there  is no 
Frege-Russell type difference in meaning for Aristotle between the different occur­
rences of is in "Socrates is a man" and "a man is an animal." If fu r th e r  evidence is 
needed for the total absence of the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis in A ristotle, it is 
easily forthcoming.
In maintaining the unambiguity of τδ είναι v is-à-v is the Frege-Russell 
.distinction, Aristotle apparently is not just a faithful Whorfian following blindly the  
Weltanschauung implicit in  the language of the trib e , as might be suspected among 
other things on the basis of the absence of any separate verb  for existence in the 
ancient Greek. Aristotle was cognizant of the controversies tha t had raged as to 
w hether τδ and τδ ‘εν mean the same or whether they have several different 
meanings. (See De Soph. El. 33, 182 b 22 f f .)  Nor is Aristotle unaware of the 
dangers of uncritically assuming tha t what is , always is  what it is ,  and not another 
th ing , as is illu stra ted  among o ther th ings by his criticisms of Parmenides in  Phys. 
A 3 . N evertheless, his failure to acknowledge the Frege-Russell ambiguity is deeper 
than a conscious choice between competing conceptual schemes. Not only does he 
refuse to countenance the Frege-Russell distinction as a homonymy between several 
d ifferent meanings. He does not always recognize the distinction as a separation 
between different uses of the Greek words for being. More accurately speaking, he 
does acknowledge some differences between the relevant u ses , as we shall see, but 
he does not co-ordinate them into a th ree -p art or fou r-part distinction.
Even though these observations do not automatically solve any hard  in te rp re ta -  
tional problems concerning Aristotle, they help to clear away m isunderstandings.
For instance, we can now see that A ristotle 's formulas for what has la ter come to be 
known as essence, τδ τ ί  έστι (What [it] is) and τδ τι ην είνα ι (what it is  [for a 
thing] to be) exhibit for a true  Fregean an irredeemable ambiguity between
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predication and identity . For Aristotle they express ipso facto something's being 
such-and-such and its  being identical with some one entity . This is vividly shown 
by the fact that Aristotle frequently  used the very  formula as a name for his firs t 
category, substance, in spite of considering particularity  ("separability and 
'th isness '") as the main characteristic of substances. No wonder Aristotle could 
thus raise the question, which in our anachronistic ears may first sound paradoxical 
(Ross confesses th a t it is for him "difficult to see the point of th is question"), 
whether or not a substance is identical with its  essence. (See Met. Z 6 .)
2. The nonambiguity of esti does not preclude 
purely existential uses
Here and in many other contexts it is important to realize precisely what is  
involved in Aristotle’s failure — or perhaps ra th e r 'refusal — to make the 
Frege-Russell distinction. What is  denied in denying the Frege-Russell ambiguity 
claim is not that the force of "is" or *€στι is different in different contexts.
R ather, what is ruled out is one particu lar explanation of these differences, v iz . 
that they are occasioned by different meanings of the verb "is". In other words, 
what is asserted  is tha t such differences are always traceable to the context and 
due to i t. Indeed, it is an in tegral p a rt of my position th a t 'έστ.ι can have on 
d ifferent occasions in Aristotle different Fregean uses. For instance, Aristotle 
can—and does—use ^στι w ith  a purely existential force. When one says "Homer is" 
(<>Ομηρ<5$ έ σ τ ί) , what is at issue is obviously the existence of a particu lar 
individual. (Cf. De In t. 11, 21 a 25-27.) In general, when one asks ε ι *έστιν, one 
is asking whether an entity  or entities of a certain kind exist. (See Post. An. B 
1-2 .) F u rther examples of unmistakably existential uses of ’έστιΐη Aristotle are 
easily found; see e .g . C at. 10, 13 b 27-33.
In th is respec t, my thesis differs sharply from what seems to be the most 
popular reaction to the data that can be adduced against the presence of the Frege- 
Russell ambiguity in Aristotle. According to this competing view, ’éa tiis  unam­
biguous because it basically always has the predicative sense. Where it apparently 
does no t, e .g . in the existential uses listed above, we must understand the usage 
as being elliptical: "Socrates is" on th is view basically means "Socrates is something 
or else." (There may be important restric tions as to what th is "something or else" 
can be , bu t they need not detain us h e re .)
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This view seems to have been suggested by G. E. L. Owen, and it has re ­
cently kept cropping up in slightly different varian ts . There is a sense in which it 
probably comes close to being a tru e  representation of what th ings are like 
according to A ristotle’s last and final conclusions. Roughly, for any entity  to exist 
is for it to be what it is , i .e .  what it essentially is .
However, admitting th is does not mean that in  the force of the term ’έστι in  
A ristotle’s actual argumentation is tacitly predicative. For one th in g , the identifi­
cation ju st offered is probably only an approximate one, anyway. It is not clear 
that for Socrates to exist is (apud Aristotle) for him to be a man. R ather, on a 
closer look it seems (as Balme has shown) very  much as if  for Socrates to exist is  
not so much for him to exemplify (more generally, to develop towards exemplifying) 
the species-characteristic form of man, b u t ra th e r to exemplify (more accurately, 
develop towards exemplifying) the particu lar nature  which consists in his likeness 
to his p a ren ts. And it is not clear at all that Socrates' exemplifying th is  particu lar 
form is a predicative relation ra th e r than an iden tity .
Be this as it may, even if the elliptical character of ’έστχ airXös is perhaps a 
conclusion of A ristotle’s argum ents for his metaphysical theo ry , it cannot for th is 
very  reason be a p art of what he assumes in them. When I reject the ellipsis 
theories, i t  is thus as a claim of what the basic semantical force ο ΐ ’εστι and its  
cognates are for Aristotle, and not as a possible feature of his ultimate metaphysical 
doctrine. However, in the former sense I do reject it tout co u rt, and hence also 
reject the mistaken idea th a t it is somehow implied by the absence of the Frege- 
Russell ambiguity assumption from Aristotle.
This pu ts on me the onus of commenting on the  recent denials of any purely  
existential uses of v e rb s  for being in Aristotle. Suffice it here to deal with one of 
the most recent putative arguments for the absence of the existential uses in 
Aristotle or in  certain  p a rts  of the Aristotelian Corpus.
The ellipsis hypothesis has not been defended by its  reputed  originator at any 
greater length . It has recently been discussed by A. Gomez-Lobo (1980-1981). The 
p art of the Corpus which Gomez-Lobo and his ilk have to worry about most is 
clearly Post. An. B 1-2, where Aristotle in so many words recognizes questions of 
simple being (ε ΐ \ α τ t)  besides the th ree  o ther kinds of questions which figure in  
an Aristotelian science, viz. το £στι, τδ ό ιδ τ ι, and τΐ ’έστι.
Actually, stric tly  speaking Gomez-Lobo does not deny tha t a sentence of the 
form ’έστι + a noun phrase can express mere existence in  Aristotle. He admits th a t 
e .g . Met. Λ 7, 1072 a 25 is a case in point. But he strives to reduce greatly the
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scope of th is way of reading Aristotle by removing Post. A n .. B 1-2 (in fact, it 
seems, all of Post. A n .) from its  scope. Hence a brief discussion of Gomez-Lobo's 
arguments are in o rder, for if  they were valid, much of the plausibility of my point 
would be lost.
The ε\ ^στι questions used to be taken without any fu rther ado as questions 
of existence. Gomez-Lobo is entirely righ t in recognizing that the situation has 
changed. The insight tha t Aristotle did not believe in the Frege-Russell ambiguity 
and that the basic semantical meaning of ’έστι in Aristotle is hence neutral with 
respect to the different Fregean senses of being certainly makes a fresh look at 
Post. An. B 1-2 necessary . Unfortunately, Gomez-Lobo fails to give the new look a 
run  for its  money, for his arguments are inadequate in several respects. For one 
th ing , most of his discussion is predicated on a failure to understand in what sense 
Aristotle th inks that εί ’έστι questions, like all four questions, amount to looking 
for a middle term . "How can there  be a middle term between a single term and the 
predicate 'exists'?  he asks rhetorically. A straightforw ard answer would be 
embarassingly obvious even if  I had not pointed it out ten  years ago (in Hintikka 
1972a). Aristotle is thinking of as it were abbreviated syllogisms of the form
(*) Every B is simpliciter
Every Ç is B ________
Hence : Every C is simpliciter
which resu lt from a regular barbara  syllogism by omitting the major term.
It is obvious tha t (*) requires a treatm ent of existence somewhat different 
from what contemporary philosophers have been used to. However, th is is no argu ­
ment against what I am saying. Even without discussing any details here, it is 
patently  clear on o ther grounds that we have to shake our complacency concerning 
the adequacy of the received Frege-Russell treatm ent of existence in  logic.
It may be objected th a t quasi-syllogisms of the displayed form are never 
actually put forward by  A ristotle. The explanation is that he does not need to do 
so. In the syllogistic s truc tu re  of a science, the existence of the B 's is always a 
consequence of the existence of a wider term, say A. Hence Aristotle accomplishes 
the same effects by means of a regular barbara  syllogism as he accomplishes by 
means of (* ), as long as a proviso is explicitly or tacitly added to the effect that it 
is only the widest term that carries any existential force. This may perhaps be 
illustra ted  by the following quasi-syllogism:
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(**) Every B is an A (and exists)
Every C is a B (no existential force)
Hence: Every C is an A (and hence exists)
I shall not discuss here what kind of treatm ent of existence is presupposed in (*) 
and (**).
My in terpretation  gains some fu rth er credence from the fact that according to 
Aristotle necessity is "carried  downwards" in  a syllogistic chain in the same way as 
I have argued existence does. (Cf. A ristotle’s theory of apodeictic syllogisms in  P r . 
An. A 8-12 , especially 9 .) In the same w ay as in (**) it is only the major p re ­
mise tha t has to carry  an existential force in order for the conclusion to do so, in 
the same way we can obtain a necessary conclusion from a barbara  type syllogism if  
and only if  the major premise is a necessary one. I believe A ristotle’s treatm ent of 
existence and necessity in the context of a syllogism are related to each o ther very  
closely, bu t I cannot t ry  to find their g rea test common denominator here .
There is plenty of collateral evidence th a t th is is what Aristotle in fact meant. 
Since the whole argumentative s tru c tu re  of Gomez-Lobo’s paper is  thus mistaken, 
there  is little tha t apparently needs to be said of the res t of his paper.
What I also find surp rising  is that there  is conclusive evidence against 
Gomez-Lobo in the very  passages he is addressing himself to.
I mean if one is or is not simpliciter and not if  [one is] white o r not (89 
b 33).
τδ ε ι ’έστιν μή απλωί λέγω, αλλ* ουκ ει λευκδΐ μη.
How could Aristotle possibly have explained more clearly by  the means he had 
at his disposal that he was presupposing a purely existential use of 
ε\ ^στι? It seems to me that we have to realize that Aristotle, like J . L. A ustin, 
ordinarily means what he says.
Ironically, A ristotle 's very  usage in  Post. An. B 1-2 provides us with fu r th e r  
counter-examples to the ellipsis thesis . When Aristotle there  asks w hether a middle 
term is (ε ι ’έστι μέσον, cf. 89 b 37-38, 90 a 6), he cannot but mean w hether the 
middle ex ists , for he contrasts this question in so many words with the question as 
to what it is .
There is elsewhere, too, excellent direct evidence against the ellipsis- 
hypothesis. In discussing in De Soph. El. 5 the importance of distinguishing the
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absolute and the relative uses of a term from each other Aristotle writes (167 a 
4-6):
ου γδρ ταυτδ τδ μδ 
cε ι ν α ί  τι καί αιιλώ5 μδ 
ε ί ν α ι ,  φαίνεται δδ 
διδ τδ πάρεγγυ$ τηΐ  
λέξεωί καί μικρδν διαφέρειν  
τδ ε ίνα ι  τι  τοΟ ε’ΐ ν α ι ,  
καί τδ μδ ε ίνα ι  τι
■J
τοΟ μδ εηναι.
For it is not the same thing 
not to be something and not 
to be simpliciter, though 
owing to the similarity of 
language to be something 
appears to differ only a little 
from to be, and not to be 
something from not to b e .
On can scarcely ask for more direct evidence. At the same time the passage shows 
that in spite of the ir differences, the predicative and the absolute (existential) uses 
o f ’€στιν are not unrelated, for they are the relative and absolute uses of the same 
notion. The quoted passage hence also offers evidence against ascribing the 
Frege-Russell ambiguity to Aristotle.
3 . Essential predication. involves identification
Thus realizing Aristotle's failure to make the Frege-Russell distinction does not 
necessitate throwing overboard all earlier views concerning Aristotle's treatment of 
being, even though it does necessitate a fresh  look at the evidence. (There seems 
to me to be far too much of a fashion in the cu rren t litera tu re  to disparage earlier 
in terpretations ju st because they did not take into account some important aspects 
of A ristotle 's treatm ent of "is". Such a failure may be regrettab le , bu t it does not 
automatically invalidate all the in terpretations of a scholar.) Nevertheless, 
dispensing with the Frege-Russell dogma opens the door to certain fu rth er lines of 
thought. In the same way as the Aristotelian ’έστι sometimes has existential force 
and sometimes does not, in the same way it sometimes has the force of identity  and 
sometimes does not. The unmistakable upshot of such passages as Met. Γ 4, 1007 a 
20-33, Met. Δ 18, 1022 a 25-26, or Post An. A 22, 83 a 24-32; A 4, 73 b 5-8 is 
tha t the former cases are of the nature of what is in the misleading 
tw entieth-century terminology known as "essential" predications and the la tte r as 
"accidental" predications. The misleading character of these labels is due to the fact 
that they are easily taken to refer to a purely modal distinction. Indeed, they have
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been so taken in recent discussion, where the term "Aristotelian essentialism" is 
used as a label for a position v is-à-v is the foundations of modal logic and modal 
metaphysics. What we have discovered is a prima facie nonmodal element in 
A ristotle 's essential-accidental distinctions, an element that seems to have been 
largely overlooked in tw entieth-century  philosophy.
Of course , even if  we try  to s ta r t from a prima facie completely nonmodal 
distinction between identity  and predication, we will end up linking the distinction 
with various modal considerations. I cannot discuss th is m atter here beyond 
pointing out tha t in  th is way A ristotle 's distinction gets linked up much more with 
recent discussions of the nature  of the individuals presupposed in our use of modal 
concepts and of the  nature  of the  identities which may hold between them than with 
discussions of so-called "Aristotelian essentialism ."
The non-modal character of A ristotle 's distinction is heightened by the fact 
that the  whole possible-worlds treatm ent of modalities, so popular and so pervasive 
in our d ay s , was completely foreign to Aristotle for whom the only reality was th is 
sequence of potential nows each of which will momentarily be actualized. Bence even 
Aristotelian potentialities had to prove the ir mettle within th is  one actual world 
h istory  of ours, and so had his notions of form, essence, and one-ness.
In spite of what I said of the mistakes of tw entieth-century  philosophers, my 
point here is not entirely new. M. J . Woods has argued "that Aristotle held that a 
statem ent like 'Socrates is a man' was, despite appearances, to be construed as a 
statement of iden tity ."  In defense of his view. Woods refers to such Aristotelian 
passages as Met, Δ 18, 1022 a 26-27; Z 4, 1029 b 28; Z 7, 1032 b 1-2; Z 7 , 1032 b 
1-2; Z 8, 1034 a 8. This is not the place to evaluate his evidence. It seems to me 
that Woods could have strengthened his argument by a more general examination of 
the sta tu s  of the "is" in  A ristotle 's "Socrates is a man" v is-à-v is the failure of the 
Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis and of the resulting  freedom for Aristotle to pick 
and choose between different uses (not senses) of ’έστιν.
Moreover, Woods' diagnosis, rightly  understood, pertains to A ristotle 's problem 
ra th e r than to his solution. For what it is that follows from saying th a t in  an 
essential predication like "Socrates is a man" the "is" has the force of identify?
Very little , for we are then faced with the next question: What is it about certain 
predicates tha t enable them to individuate their bearers in such a way tha t the "is" 
of predication assumes the force of "is" of identity? And which predicates are  of 
such a k ind, anyway? Clearly, these are among the main questions Aristotle
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discusses in Met. Z and Γ, bu t unfortunately understanding his problem does not 
automatically enable us to understand his attempted solution equally fully.
We do receive, however, some instant help in appreciating A ristotle's 
discussion. For instance, clearly not any old universal predicate individuates its 
bearers in the required  way. Understandably, Aristotle is quick to point th is out. 
This gives rise  to passages which have been taken to imply that for Aristotle what 
to us look like predications cannot have an element *of an identity  judgment. One 
such passage is Met. Z 13, 1038 b 34 -  a 1. It is not clear, however, which way 
this notoriously difficult passage cu ts . One major problem with it is that it 
apparently contradicts what Aristotle says earlier in Met. Z 6. Here at 1038 b 34 -  
a 3 he says th a t none of the things p resen ts universally is a substance (εκ τε δτ*ι 
τούτων ΘεωροΟσι φανερδν£ότι ουδέν των καθόλου υπαρχόντων ουσία εσ τ ί ,  καί *ότι ουδΙν 
σημαίνει τ&ν κοιντί καταγορουμόνων τόδε τ ι ,  αλλά το ιό ν δ ε .) .  But earlier in Met. Z 6, 
1032 a 4 ff. Aristotle had identified the substance of a th ing  with its  essence, 
which presumably can be shared , and later he likewise comes to identify it with the  
th ing’s form. (See e .g . Met. Z 17, 1041 b 4-9 .) Without being able to discuss the 
problem at the length it deserves—and requ ires—surely an important p a rt of the 
explanation of these apparently contrasting passages in that they are p art and 
parcel of the dialectical process of teasing out the difference between those 
predicates in connection with which ’όστιν is used as what we would call the "is’’ of 
identity  and those in which the predicate is a mere universal. In fact, much of the 
earlier discussion in  Z 13 can be understood as sketching out th is  very  con trast.
O ther apparent counter-evidence to ray suggestions in  th is section can likewise 
be disposed of easily. For instance, in De Soph. El. 22, 178 b 39 -  a 10 Aristotle 
says tha t what is  predicated of a τόδε τ ι  is not itself a particu la r, bu t a quality or 
quantity  or a relation "or something of that so rt."  These statem ents don't rep resen t 
his considered la te r opinion, however, which is th a t a predication which is not of 
the nature  of an identification is precisely an accidental predication. That th is  is 
indeed Aristotle’s doctrine is recognized by Kirwan (pp. 100-101) on the basis of 
Met. Γ 4, 1007 a 20-33, even though he goes on to accuse Aristotle of committing a 
logical mistake in maintaining th is view: " . . .e v e n  if it is possible to make sense of 
the distinction betv/een essential and coincidental predication, the former are  no 
more statements of identity  than the la tte r a re ."  Kirwan is here relying precisely on 
the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis , which we have found totally inapplicable to 
A ristotle.
4. Instantiation in natural languages: a systematic view
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Suffice th is as an indication of one line of though opened by our observations. 
To re tu rn  to the main theme of this paper, notice that from the absence of the 
Frege- Russell ambiguity it does not follow that there  might not be other 
ambiguities about *έστ\ν, over and above the non-ambiguous differences in use which 
Frege and Russell mistakenly raised to the level of ambiguities. F u rther light can 
be thrown on th is  question, too, by means of recent topical in sigh ts . There is in 
fact another major way in which recent logical and semantical work on the concept 
of being pu ts Aristotle in  an in teresting  new perspective. In o rder to see what it 
is , we have to stray  temporarily away from Aristotle and discuss certain  topical 
problems in the logic of na tural languages. I shall discuss them in the case of 
English, even though similar th ings can be said of o ther languages, including 
ancient Greek.
These problems are as close to the heart of all Sprachlogik as we can hope to 
get. Any logician knows tha t the lifeblood of virtually all in te resting  logical 
techniques in th a t basic p a rt of logic which is variously known as f irs t-o rd e r logic, 
quantification theory , or lower predicate calculus are the ru les of instantiation ( i .e . 
rules for substitu ting  names or name-like terms for quantified variab les). Now 
suppose we want to deal with the logic of natural languages d irectly , without first 
attem pting the dubious and by th is time largely discredited translation to formal 
languages. Then our first task  is to formulate, likewise directly for natural 
languages, ru les of instantiation for the quantifier phrases which take over the role 
of quantified variables in natural languages. How can we do that? How are we to 
deal w ith, say, a quantifier phrase like "every white horse which Alexander rode" 
or "some small town where Socrates lived," occurring in a context X -  W? (We take 
here the general form of these quantifier phrases to be
every
some
Y + wh-word + Z
where Z contains a "trace" to indicate where the wh-word was "moved away from .") 
Now the obvious way of formulating instantiation rules for such phrases is to 
legitimize a move from the sentence in which they occur to sentences like
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(1) X -  b  -  W if b is a white horse 
and Alexander rode b
o r, respectively,
(2) X -  d -  W and d is a small town and 
Socrates lived in d ,
where "_b" and "d" are the respective instantiating term s. In general, the output of 
an instantiation step is of the form
where _b_ is the instantiating  term and Z' is like Z except that the trace has been
important difference between the situation in formal firs t-o rd e r languages and 
natural languages. In the former, a single domain of values for the substitu ting  
terms (e .g . my "b" and "d") is given. In the la tte r , the entities referred  to by the 
substitution-values have to be chosen from different sub domains in  different cases. 
For instance, in (1) b has to be a living creatu re , whereas in (2) d has to be a 
location in space.
It lies close at hand for a logician to say tha t the only novelty here is tha t 
natural languages employ many-sorted quantification theory (more generally, 
m any-sorted logic). And th is need not by itself introduce any complications 
(contrary  to what is e .g . implied in J . M. E. Moravcsik 1976). Indeed, m any-sorted 
logics do not involve any serious new difficulties over and above one-sorted ones.
Yet there  is a new question presen t here. In m any-sorted formal logics, the 
sortal differences are indicated by notational conventions. How are these differences 
marked in natural languages? How can one tell what subdomain b or d must belong
Some clues are obvious, and the most obvious is the relative pronoun which 
disappears in the process of instantiation. (These relative pronouns can be taken to 
be question words in a new role, except that "what" is replaced by " th a t." )  If the 
operative word is "who," the relevant subdomain consists of persons, if  "w here," of 
locations in space, if  "w hen,” of moments (and /or periods) of time, etc . F urther
(3) X -  b -  W
replaced by "b" with the appropriate preposition. (We have been assuming that Y 
and Z aré here singu lar.)
The details need not detain us here . What is of in terest to us here is an
to?
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subdomains are introduced by prepositional phrases containing similar words, for 
instance "like which" introducing a realm of qualities ("some color like which you 
have never seen"). Clearly there  is not a sharp  one-to-one correspondence between 
the ranges of natural-language quantifiers (my "subdomains") and different relative 
pronouns (or o ther w h-w ords, with or without prepositions or similar q u a lifie rs), 
bu t a rough-and-ready  correspondence certainly obtains.
However, th is cannot be the only clue to the choice of the subdomain. For one 
th ing , the whole relative clause ;can be missing from the quantifier phrase in 
question, and hence be unavailable to supply any leads. Hence it  is  the meaning of 
Y in  (3) which must supply the main information as to which subdomain (so rt) we 
are dealing with. Presumably we must assume some kind of semantical categorization 
of the terms (phrases) th a t can serve as the Y in (3). In the case of simple term s 
these must be p a rt of the ir lexical meaning. Since the Y’s in (3) are basically 
predicate term s, we end up in th is way postulating a classification of all simple 
predicates of English into certain equivalence classes. These classes will be 
correlated one-to-one with those subdomains of quantification, which we are dealing 
with, when using quantifiers in English, i .e .  the largest classes of entities we can 
quantify over, and also correlated in a loose way with certain  wh-words and 
phrases.
The need of relying on Y for our choice of the subdomain is vividly seen from 
the fac t that if  we try  to eliminate Y (in the way in which we could dispense with 
the relative clause), we would end up with an ungrammatical expression. In o rd er 
to p reserve grammatically , we must amplify the quantifier word itself so as to make 
it capable of conveying the crucial information: some becomes someone, som ething, 
somewhere, sometime, somehow, etc. where the added handle serves to be tray  the 
relevant sort (subdomain).
Furtherm ore, since each instantiation step (witness (3)) introduces an 
occurrence of " is", these correlated classifications are likewise correlated with a 
distinction between different uses of "is", v iz. those th a t could have originated 
from an application of the instantiation ru les , plus of course those that are logically 
on par with them.
Thus we are led to recognize four correlated multiple distinctions. They 
distinguish from each other
(i) Certain wh-words (and phrases with w h-w ords).
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(ii) Different kinds of simple predicates.
(ni) The largest classes of entities we have to recognize in the logic of our 
language as domains of quantification.
(iv) Certain semantically different cases of "is". (In them we of course cannot 
distinguish from each other the  is of identity , existence, and 
predication.)
i
5. What do Aristotelian categories categorize?
At th is point you are supposed to have a deja vu experience. For what I have 
arrived  at by means of purely systematic (logical and semantical) considerations is 
to all practical purposes tantamount to Aristotle’s theory of categories. One of the 
most fundamental and most perplexing questions concerning A ristotle’s distinction 
between different categories is: What is being distinguished from each other? What 
is Aristotle classifying in separating the different categories from each other? He 
uses different Greek question words or question phrases ( τ ί  έ σ τ ι , ποσόν, ποιόν, 
πρβ5 t i ,  που, ποτό) as names for six of the categories, and the other labels likewise 
go naturally with certain types of questions in Greek. This is p re tty  much how he 
in fact presen ts his categories in Top. I, 9. He envisages different kinds of 
entities ’’put before one" and classifies the different th ings th a t can be said (and 
by implication asked) of i t .
But when Aristotle introduces his categories in C at. 4, they appear as classes 
of simple predicates o r ’’th ings that can be said" of an entity . Which are they?
The plot is thickened fu rth er by Aristotle’s deeply ingrained habit of 
considering categories as the widest genera of entities that can be logically 
considered together. This is seen for instance from Met. Γ1 1003 b 19 ff. or from 
Post. An. A 22, 83 b 10-17.
Furtherm ore, Aristotle indicates repeatedly tha t the distinction between the 
different categories goes together with a correlated distinction between different 
uses of %στιν. What is more, occasionally he seems to run  the two distinctions 
together. For instance in Met. Z 1, 1028 a 10 ff. "that which is" is said to signify 
the different categories. See also Met. Δ 7, 1017 a 23-30.
Scholars have debated intensively which of these different th ings Aristotle 
"really" meant. For instance, one persuasion maintains tha t the categories rep resen t
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the different kinds of questions one can (according to Aristotle) ask of a given 
en tity . This view is in different variants held by among others Ockham, Charles 
Kahn, Benveniste, and Ackrill. Other scholars hold that Aristotelian categories are 
what he says they a re , predicables. O thers, led by the formidable Hermann Bonitz, 
have have held that categories were for Aristotle f irs t and foremost the widest 
genera of en tities. "Sie bezeichnen die obersten Geschlechter, deren einem jedes 
Seiende sich muss unterordnen lassen ," he proclaims (p . 623 of the original).
Still o thers have held that Aristotle’s category distinction is primarily a 
differentiation between several senses of ’έ σ τ ι , a reminder of the "systematic 
ambiguity" of words for being in Aristotle. This view was represen ted  by 
Heinrich Maier, and in a sense it  can be maintained that G.E.L Owen is another 
case in point. He has certainly been followed by a host of younger scholars.
If we had not seen tha t Aristotle is completely free from the Frege-Russell 
ambiguity assumption, we might also be puzzled by the fact tha t the distinction 
between the different uses of εστι in the different categories sometimes appears 
prima facie as a distinction between different kinds of existential is (cf. e .g . the 
Topics discussion whether τδ *6v is a g en u s), sometimes as a distinction between 
different kinds of predicative is  (cf. e .g . P r. An. A 37, 49 a 6-9, read in 
conjunction with the preceding chapter) , and sometimes as one between different 
kinds of iden tity . These different emphases in Aristotle have found their fans. For 
instance, as Ross rep o rts , "Apelt regards the categories as primarily a classification 
of the meaning of the copula ’is '"  whereas Bonitz stresses the existential and 
identity  senses.
Some of the shrew der scholars have responded to th is problem situation by 
suggesting tha t Aristotle was led to his distinction between the different categories 
by several convergent rou tes. For instance, Ackrill suggests tha t in Aristotle’s 
classification th ere  are two elements, f irs t the idea th a t different kinds of questions 
will have "categorically" different answ ers, and second the idea of categories as the 
highest genera. This is undoubtably a step in the righ t direction. However, 
philosophers taking such a line will nevertheless face the almost equally perplexing 
problem as to why the different distinctions Aristotle had in mind should coincide — 
or at least why Aristotle should have thought that they coincide. By and large, 
they have not solved th is problem. Ackrill says merely th a t, "It is not surprising  
that these two ways of grouping things together should produce the same resu lts ."  
This opinion simply will not stand up to scru tiny  when viewed in the cold light of 
contemporary analyses of questions and answ ers. (Cf. Hintikka 1976.) Contrary to
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what Ackrill suggests, it is not at all clear that answers to different questions fall 
into mutually exclusive classes which correspond to the widest classes of en tities. 
For instance, it is perfectly  legitimate to reply to the question "Who is the head of 
the Academy?" not only by saying "Plato" or "a man", bu t alternatively "a blond", 
"the youngest b ro ther of Potone", or even "he is sitting  there" , all of which have 
to be pigeonholed in different categories. Only by means of a fu rth e r analysis can 
one perhaps hope to eliminate some of these replies a*5 amounting only to partial 
answers (or as supplying collateral information to back up the conclusiveness of an 
answ er). Worse still, AckrilTs account is intrinsically inconsistent. For if  the 
appropriate answers to different questions belong to d ifferent categories, it is 
impossible to construe A ristotle 's categories as answers to one and the same 
question "What is it?" as Ackrill also suggests. Even if what he says can somehow 
be salvaged in the last analysis, it does not help us to understand what A ristotle’s 
categories really were in the least. Prima facie, it  is far from obvious that the four 
correlated distinctions we find in Aristotle should go together, and Aristotelian 
scholars certainly have not supplied valid reasons why they should do so.
6. Aristotle reconstructed
Now the brief analysis of the conditions of the conditions of instantiation which 
I carried  out above, pu ts both Aristotle's theory and discussions thereof into a new 
perspective. Led by purely topical (logical and semantical) argum ents, we have 
arrived  a t a remarkable reconstruction of A ristotle 's theory of categories. (My 
argum ents have an even stronger theoretical motivation than  I have spelled out 
here , for they ensue from the basic ideas of the highly successful approach to 
language analysis which I have called game-theoretical semantics. For i t ,  see 
Saarinen 1979.) We can now recognize all the apparently discrepant ingredients of 
A ristotle 's doctrine in the systematic situation revealed by my analysis. A ristotle 's 
use of question words and phrases as labels for categories matches my use of 
wh-words as a guide to the subdomain involved in an instantiation. His view of 
categories as the different kinds of simple th ings that can be said of an entity  
matches my classification of the meanings of simple predicates as guides to the 
logical "sort" intended. His use of categories as the largest classes of logically 
comparable entities amounts to the focal point of my quest of the different largest 
domains of quantification presupposed in a natural language, and A ristotle's 
correlation of d ifferent uses of the word ^στι corresponds to the automatic
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alignment in  my treatm ent of the other distinctions with certain differences in the 
use of the word " is" .
What is more im portant, the correlation of these several distinctions is  seen not 
to be accidental or artificial. Its reasons lie deep in the logic of the situation. 
Charles Kahn has suggested tha t the different Aristotelian distinctions rep resen t 
d ifferent s tra ta  in  A ristotle 's thinking. That may very  well be so, but we don't 
understand  Aristotle unless we also recognize the in trinsic  logical connections 
between the different correlated classifications of his. No longer does it make any 
sense to ask which of the several distinctions Aristotle "really" means, for they are 
all inextricably intertw ined. The extensive controversies that have been prompted 
by th is question are simply otiose. (This does not mean tha t differences of emphasis 
are not called for here; c f . my comments below on those who stre ss  the ties 
between categories and question ty p es .)  The in teresting  questions pertain  instead 
(in te r  alia) to A ristotle’s awareness of the connecting links between the different 
distinctions. Indeed, it is in spelling out the main interrelations between the 
distinctions which converge in Aristotle’s theory of categories that my 
"transcendental deduction of the categories" goes essentially beyond those earlier 
scholars who have emphasized the multi-faceted character of Aristotelian categories.
Even though the reconstruction of Aristotelian categories which we have just 
reached, perhaps does not ipso facto solve any major in terpretational problems, it 
yields valuable clues which help to understand  Aristotle and in many cases even 
promise fu rth e r insigh ts. For instance, one problem we can now approach perta ins 
to the relation of A ristotle 's theory to the facts of the Greek language.
Trendelenburg, Apelt, and Benveniste have claimed that the Aristotelian 
distinction between different categories reflects certain general features of the  
ancient Greek language. Ackrill's persuasive arguments to the effect tha t what is 
distinguished from each other in the category distinctions are not verbal 
expressions bu t entities may serve as an antidote to such excesses. However, 
Ackrill’s thesis does not imply that Aristotle was not guided by  logical s tru c tu res  
which manifest themselves in the grammar of the Greek language. I cannot t ry  to 
write e ither a transformational grammar or a game-theoretical semantics for the 
ancient Greek language. Suffice it merely to point out that the grammatical facts 
which are highlighted by my treatm ent are less eye-catching but sub tler than  those 
flaunted by Trendelenburg and Benveniste. They pertain  to such th ings as the 
identity  (in form) of indefinite relatives with indirect in terrogatives in  Greek, and 
the close relationship of both with quantifier words. These features of the Greek
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grammar serve to link the different correlated distinctions explained above to each 
other especially closely, and thereby to motivate Aristotle’s theory . If I had to find 
linguistic evidence for my in terpretation of Aristotle, that is the direction in which 
I could (and would) go. Even on the p resen t superficial level, it  is not hard  to see 
that my treatm ent of instantiation works mutatis mutandis even b e tte r  with Greek 
than with English.
Likewise, we are now in a position to draw an in teresting  conclusion from our 
observations. The different classés of questions with which Aristotle correlated his 
o ther distinctions were primarily indirect questions. The correlation depends 
crucially on an analogy between relative pronouns and question w ords, and th is 
analogy (or near identity) can obviously be best argued for by comparing with each 
o ther the logical behavior of relative clauses and indirect questions. (An especially 
useful Mittelglied here is the class of relative clauses without antecedents. Their 
logic is remarkably similar to th a t of indirect questions.) A ristotle’s distinction 
between different categories is less a distinction between different question types as 
between question words, and it pertains to these words in so far as they are doing 
duty for their relative clause tw ins.
This observation reflects somewhat unfavorably on those scholars who have 
made much of the classification of questions as the alleged cornerstone of 
Aristotelian categories. It seems to me that the ir thesis remains unproven. 
Admittedly, the importance of the dialectical questioning games practiced in the  
Academy for Aristotle can scarcely be exaggerated. However, th ere  is  little 
evidence in the Topics or elsewhere that the theory of categories was developed for 
(or from) such games.
7. Is the reconstructed Aristotelian theory correct?
Categories v s. logical types
Here we come to some of the most crucial questions concerning Aristotle’s 
theory of categories. Is the theory correct as an analysis of the ’’logic” of the 
Greek language (or of the English language)? Are there differences between 
different languages v is-à-v is Aristotelian categories? The "transcendental deduction" 
of Aristotelian categories p resented  above might seem to vindicate the main features 
of A ristotle 's theory . In spite of its  persuasiveness, it nevertheless gives us only 
an approximation to the tru e  semantical theory of natural language categories. It is 
based upon assumptions which are only partly  tru e , and hence it cannot be taken
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as the last and final word on the subject. Below -, I shall indicate one specific 
limitation of my argument and consequently of our reconstructed theory of 
Aristotelian categories. On a general theoretical level, another major shortcoming of 
the theory is obvious, connected with its  relation to logical type distinctions. It is 
in a wider logical and philosophical perspective clear that even Aristotelian category 
distinctions must in the last analysis be based on type distinctions. The la tte r 
distinctions may not coincide with Russell’s. Indeed, the types (categories) of Frege 
and Russell seem to me too few and too far apart to serve as a realistic basis of 
our Sprachlogik. B ut, whatever the requisite types a re , they must serve as the 
foundation of any viable distinction between different categories. In o ther words, 
some bridge has to be constructed from Aristotelian categories to logical ones to 
vindicate them. How foreign modern type distinctions were for Aristotle is also 
illustra ted  by his deeply ingrained habit of bracketing together the obtaining of 
(what we would call) facts and the existence of individuals. (See e .g . Met. Z 17, 
1041 a 14-16, b 4 -5 .)
This general problem is highlighted by the more specific observation that ·. 
Aristotelian categories tu rn  out on my analysis to be quite different from logical 
categories in the sense of logical types. (This point is relevant here among o ther 
reasons because the contrary has been maintained by Gilbert Ryle; cf. Ryle 
1937-1938.) Not only is  i t  the case that entities of a different logical type (in what 
is  roughly Russell's sense) belong to the same category, as Socrates, man, and 
animal all belong to the so-called category of substance. There is a sense in which 
all categories come close to containing entities of the same logical type. After all, 
they all contain items which can be said of a substance like Socrates. For instance, 
the members of the so-called category of relation are not relations for A ristotle, but 
relatives (relational p red icates). This is  amply shown by his discussion of th is 
category in Cat. 7, 8 a 35 f f . ,  especially his comments on correlatives and the ir 
epistemic and ontological interdependence. (Cf. C at. 6, 6 a 35 f f . ;
De Soph. El. 31, 181 b 26-28; Top. VI, 4, 142 a 28-31; and VI, 8, 146 b 3 -4 .) 
Likewise, quantities are not for Aristotle what we would mean by them (e .g . a 
leng th ), bu t quantitative a ttribu tes (e .g . being of such-and-such leng th ).
These observations are perhaps not very  su rp rising . There is a sense in 
which the very  ’’category" of relation (as distinguished from relational predicates) 
came to its  own only much later in the history  of philosophy. (Cf. Weinberg 1965.) 
However, the absence.of relations proper from Aristotle's categorical scheme 
highlights the problems it leads into. For where else can he put relations? The only
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propositional form he seems to recognize is the subject-predicate one. If some of 
those predicates are relational, we need an account as to how some of them can be 
built of relations. A lternatively, we need a reduction of relational propositions to 
subject-predicate propositions. Neither task  was attempted by A ristotle, although 
the la tte r  one was undertaken by Leibniz, whose philosophy is in the last analysis 
much more Aristotelian than  is usually recognized. (Cf. here Hintikka 1972b.)
Similar rem arks can be made about several o ther categories, especially about 
the categories of quantity , place’, time, and action.
These are illustrations of deeper and more widespread tensions in  Aristotle’s 
thought. In trea ting  (at least in its  f irs t stage) all categories on a p a r Aristotle (as 
well as my rational reconstruction of his theory) fails to give a deeper account of 
the rationale of category distinctions. It is for th is reason especially important to 
realize the differences between Aristotelian categories and logical types .
It is here tha t Aristotle’s relative neglect of the Frege-Russell distinction 
(even as a difference in use and not just as a difference in meaning) becomes a 
handicap for him. Admittedly, it  was claimed by Maier tha t A ristotle’s theory of 
categories was calculated to accommodate certain distinctions between different 
senses of "is” . (See vol. 2, p . 291 f f . ) Maier's distinctions include most of the 
Frege-Russell ones. Indeed, Maier's firs t two distinctions are identificatory being 
v s. accidentally predicatory being, p . 280, and existential v s . copulative being, 
p . 282. No major insights are forthcoming from Maier, however, into the way 
Aristotle managed to combine the Frege-Russell distinction with his doctrine of 
categories. For he firmly believes th a t, according to Aristotle, "immediate reflection 
on the concept of being [Maier’s em phasis]... forms the principle of division for the 
table of categories" (pp . 298-299). Maier’s immediacy claim notw ithstanding,
Aristotle himself does hot tru s t  immediate intuition here , bu t discusses the relation 
of o ther categories to tha t of a substance. However, these argum ents are either 
calculated to show the dependence of o ther categories on th a t of substance, or 
(which may come down to the same thing) to point out the role of focal meaning in  
relating the being of the other categories to th a t of substance. They do not rely  on 
the kinds of distinctions which Maier mentions or which are likely to be made by  a 
tw entieth-century logician. All told, it thus remains a m ystery — or at least an 
unaccomplished explanatory task  — how Aristotelian categories can be related to 
such logical distinctions as those between different logical types.
These difficulties offer us an incentive to improve our in te rp re tive  framework 
so as to bridge the gap between Aristotelian categories and logical ones. We also
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have to try  to understand A ristotle’s own efforts to overcome the separation 
between different categories. The la tte r question has been discussed convincingly 
by G. E. L. Owen, and I will not trea t it here . The former question likewise admits 
of d ifferent kinds of approaches. At least two important lines of thought are 
forthcoming here.
Above we studied the ways in which expressions^for the different categories 
en ter into a complex proposition containing quantifiers. This study has to be 
supplemented by an account of the ways in which categorically d ifferent expressions 
en ter into primitive ( ’’atomic”) propositions. It was precisely such an account tha t 
we saw earlier Aristotle failing to give in  the case of relations (and in  the case of 
several o ther categories). Admittedly, Aristotle argues for the primacy of substance 
over o ther categories, but he does not analyze the nature of this primacy or the 
role of o ther categories in a way which would relate them to logical type 
distinctions.
Secondly, the very  s tru c tu re  of such quantifier phrases as were discussed 
above (e .g . ’’every white horse which Alexander rode") can be analyzed fu rth e r.
One especially in teresting  analysis has been offered by Joan B resnan. It can be 
illustra ted  by comparing the nonrelative p art of those simple quantifier phrases we 
have so fa r  considered ("every white horse”) with an example of a richer 
s tru c tu re , e .g . "every two bottles of fine red  wine".
Neither of these lines of inquiry  seems to be connected with A ristotle 's efforts 
to overcome categorical alienation in his m etaphysics, even though the second is 
related to his form-matter contrast.
In spite of their inconclusiveness, these considerations are highly relevant to 
the subject m atter of th is paper, viz. to the question of the ambiguity or 
nonambiguity of being. If all we are dealing with — or ra th e r, Aristotle was dealing 
with — is a m any-sorted theory , there  is no reason to th ink  that any ambiguity of 
the verb s for being is implied by his theory . In o rder to have given reasons for a 
genuine ambiguity, Aristotle ought to have given the kind of fu rth e r  analysis of his 
categories which would have related them to logical types. This he never does, 
however, and hence the vaunted ambiguity of being between different Aristotelian 
categories remains at best an unproven and unargued-for dogma. It is not even 
clear w hether Aristotle held any clear-cut ambiguity thesis f o r ^ a t i  as used in 
different categories, for his terminology strongly suggests tha t he took himself to 
be discussing differences in use ra th e r than ambiguities. (Cf. Hintikka 1959.)
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